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UNJUST ENRICHMENT, "EXISTING CATEGORIES" AND
KERR v. BARANOW: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR McINNES
by john D. McCamus*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent note' on the important decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Kerr v. Baranow,2 Professor McInnes argued,
not for the first time,' that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co. 4 effected a complete
transformation of the Canadian law of restitution into a single
rule, drawn from the civilian tradition, that restitutionary recovery
is invariably granted unless there is "no juristic reason" or an
"absence of basis" for the initial transfer of wealth from plaintiff to
defendant. The "old" common law approach under which the
plaintiff must explain why recovery is appropriate on the basis of
existing precedents has, in his view, been simply rejected and
replaced by this new civilian doctrine. Much to my surprise,
however, he also claims in his recent note that this rather radical
thesis has been clearly adopted by the Supreme Court in the recent
Kerr v. Baranow decision. My respectful view, simply stated, is that
I could not disagree more with the account Professor McInnes has
offered of the significance of this decision.
Professor McInnes begins his note with a statement of his views
as to the significance of Garland. For McInnes, a plaintiff in a
restitution case should now simply ignore the "old" common law
and advance a claim on the basis of the "absence of juristic reason"
analysis set forth in Garland. Indeed, he asserts that his view of the
significance of Garland now represents "orthodoxy" and that the
Supreme Court's alleged embrace of the McInnes thesis in Kerr is
an exercise in "re-establishing orthodoxy." 5 Professor McInnes
then caught my attention by describing my own views to the
* Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg
LLP.
1. M. McInnes, "A Return to First Principles in Unjust Enrichment: Kerr i.
Baranow" (2011), 51 C.B.L.J. 275.
2. (2011), 328 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269.
3. M. Mcinnes, B.M.P. Global Distributions Inc. i. Bank of Nova Scotia: The
Unitary Action in Unjust Enrichment (2009), 48 C.B.L.J. 102.
4. (2004), 237 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629.
5. McInnes. supra. footnote 1, at p. 276.
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contrary as "startling." Further he indicated that my views are
"bereft of judicial support, wrong in principle, and potentially
disastrous in practice." 6 1 beg to differ on all points. I do not think
my views are "startling." Nor are they at all original or eccentric. I
believe they simply reflect the traditional common sense of the
common law. I do not believe that they are bereft of judicial
support. More particularly, I believe that Kerr reaffirms that the
role of the Garland analysis is more limited than Mclnnes suggests.
I am not aware of a "principle" that demonstrates that my views
are wrong in principle. Nor do I think my views are "potentially
disastrous in practice."
II. MY "STARTLING" VIEWS
Simply stated, my view is that in a restitution case, as in a
contract or tort or, indeed, any other kind of private law case, a
plaintiff should rely upon and present to the court existing
authorities which demonstrate that on the alleged facts, the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. In short, in a restitution
claim, the plaintiff would at least begin by attempting to establish
that on the existing authorities or, one might say, on the existing
law, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. In the law of restitution,
there is quite a lot of existing law for the plaintiff to consider. The
existing authorities, which number in the thousands and stretch
back over the last several centuries, establish an elaborate body of
rules dealing with such matters as the recovery of benefits
conferred under mistake, under duress and under transactions
which are ineffective for various reasons, in response to
emergencies and, as well, benefits acquired by the defendant
through various forms of wrongdoing.7 The rules relating to the
recovery of benefits conferred by mistake, for example, set out the
tests for determining the kinds of mistakes that ground recovery,
the types of benefits for which recovery is permitted, the defences
available to a defendant in a mistake case and so on. The rules on
necessitous intervention specify the types of emergencies and the
types of benefits conferred that ground relief. The rules relating to
duress set out the tests for the kinds of threats that constitute
duress, the forms of relief available, the defences and so on.
6. Ibid., at p. 280.
7. This very large body of common law doctrine is restated at length in the standard
texts on restitution, including P.D. Maddaugh and J.D. McCamus, The Law of
Restitution (looseleaf ed.) (Toronto, Canada Law Book, 2011).
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Similarly, large bodies of black letter rules are set out in the
authorities dealing with the various other types of claims that are
commonly gathered together by treatise writers as forming the
content of the substantive law of restitution. If the plaintiff
successfully establishes that the facts are as alleged and that the
alleged facts engage one of the existing rules for granting
restitutionary relief - for example, the threats uttered by the
defendant constitute a recognized form of duress - restitutionary
relief will follow. It is this reliance on existing authority, of course,
that gives the common law much of its stability and predictability.
I confess that this seems so obvious to me that I have difficulty
understanding why Professor McInnes would disagree.
What then is the role of the general principle against unjust
enrichment which is said by many, myself included, to be the
general principle underlying the great bulk of the restitutionary
doctrine affording restitutionary relief in various factual contexts?
It is well accepted that in addition to the virtues of stability and
predictability, the common law has an inherent capacity to evolve
and adjust over time. Sometimes the evolution of doctrine reflects
a rationalization of existing rules in order to achieve consistency of
approach to the resolution of similar conflicts. Often, however, the
common law will evolve in light of changing social and economic
conditions or changing perceptions of the just result. Such change
occurs across our private law generally. Tort law is not beyond the
capacity to recognize new forms of tort liability, even, as we have
seen, in recent years.' Similarly, significant changes to the law of
contracts occur from time to time.
In the context of restitution, it is plainly recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada that the unjust enrichment principle will
provide a basis for grounding or justifying gradual evolution and
change of this kind. Thus, a plaintiff who is concerned that the
existing authorities may be unavailing, will typically add a plea
that the defendant has been simply unjustly enriched and attempt
to persuade a court that notwithstanding the lack of any support
for the claim in the existing authorities, restitutionary relief ought
to be available. In other words, resort to the general principle
provides a basis for reforming or extending existing doctrine or
recognizing new types of restitutionary claims. Resort to the
general principle for these purposes is well illustrated by the
8. Modern recognition of the tort of misfeasance in public office provides an
illustration. See Odlhavji Estate v. Woodhouse. [20031 3 S.C.R. 263.
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decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Air Canada9 case
(in which the rule denying recovery of monies paid under mistake
of law was overruled) and in the famous decision in Pettkus v.
Becker'o (in which a new type of claim for recovery of a share of
wealth accumulated during cohabitation was recognized).
Although the role of general underlying principles in other more
well-established areas of the law, such as contract and tort, is
similar in nature, it has been well understood by scholars of
restitution that this doctrinal evolution would likely occur with
more frequency in the context of restitutionary law which,
historically, has been much less studied and written about than
the other two more familiar branches of the law, contract and tort.
Indeed, apart from the American Restatement of Restitution,''
book-length studies of the law of restitution did not begin to
appear in other common law jurisdictions until the latter part of
the 20th century.
In sum, it is my view that in a restitution case, one begins by
trying to fit the facts in issue into the rules established by the
existing authorities. One may resort, however, to the underlying
general principle as a basis for correcting or extending the existing
law or recognizing new types of fact situations in which relief
should be allowed. I do not think this is a startling position.
Indeed, I think it is consistent with the views of all of the authors of
the mainstream treatises of restitution in the common law world.
At the risk of being considered tendentious, let us call this the
"Traditional Approach."
By way of contrast, the thesis advanced by Professor McInnes is
that in Canada the unjust enrichment principle has simply replaced
all the prior law. In Pettkus v. Becker,12 Dickson J. famously
restated the unjust enrichment principle in his own terms as
requiring a conferral of benefit, a corresponding deprivation of the
plaintiff and an absence of a "juristic reason" for the transfer.
There is simply no reason whatsoever to think that Dickson J.
imagined that he was, in so doing, replacing all prior restitutionary
law with his version of the unjust enrichment principle.
9. Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161;
Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 218,
[1989] I S.C.R. 1133, addt'l reasons 63 D.L.R. (4th) 768.
10. (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.
11. American Law Institute, Restatement of Restitution: Quasi-Contracts and
Constructive Trusts (St. Paul, Minnesota, American Law Institute Publishers,
1937).
12. Ibid.
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Readers familiar with the 2004 decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Garland v. Consumers' Gas' 1 will recall that in Garland,
the court offered a reformulated "two-step" version of the unjust
enrichment principle. Step one, oddly, requires the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case by disproving the existence of a long list
of defences that would otherwise be available to the defendant;
step two then permits the defendant to raise open-textured
defences of "reasonable expectations" or "public policy." Profes-
sor McInnes argues that the intention of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Garland was, again, simply to replace the old common
law with its new version of the unjust enrichment principle. On this
view, in a mistake or duress or necessitous intervention case, for
example, one would not rely on the existing rules on these types of
claims. Rather, one would simply advance the Garland two-step
version of the unjust enrichment principle as the rule or basis for
the plaintiffs recovery. I have argued elsewherel 4 that this reading
of the Garland decision is neither necessary nor sound and that to
give Garland this radical effect is quite inconsistent with the
common law method of gradual evolution of existing doctrine. As
I have there suggested, adopting this approach to the law of
restitution simply involves "making the law up from scratch"' 5 and
is likely to lead the creation of an unpredictable and unknowable
body of doctrine. Indeed, as I there noted, to the extent that some
courts have simply applied the Garland two-step analysis and
ignored prior or existing law, the decisions in question live up to
this rather dire prediction.
One must ask, then, why Professor McInnes favours so radical
an interpretation of the Garland decision. The answer appears to
be that Professor McInnes is a devoted follower of the later views
of the late Oxford Professor Peter Birks. In his last work, Unjust
Enriclunent, 16 Professor Birks recanted all of his earlier work' 7 and
offered a bold new vision for the English law of restitution. Birks
described the existing common law in which the plaintiff is
13. Supra, footnote 4.
14. J.D. McCamus, "Forty Years of Restitution: A Retrospective" (2011), 50
C.B.L.J. 474. See also Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 7, at pp. 3-35 to
3-38.2.
15. Ibid., at pp. 494-498.
16. P.B.H. Birks, Unjust Enrichment. 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2005).
17. Ibid., at p. xii ("Almost everything of mine now needs calling back for burning").
One scholar has described this later work of Birks as having been written in a
"more dogmatic and less compelling" phase of his career. See G. McMeel, "What
Kind of Jurist was Peter Birks?" (2011), 19. Rest. L. Rev. 15, at p. 28.
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required to establish that a claim advanced falls within one of the
established rules permitting restitutionary relief as the "unjust
factors" approach. He argued that the English "unjust factors"
approach ought to be rejected. Indeed, he argued that it had
already been authoritatively rejected by the House of Lords in
favour of a single rule drawn from the civil law which would allow
recovery in any case where there was an "absence of basis" for the
transfer of value to the defendant. Other than Birks, no one
seriously suggests that English courts have, indeed, rejected the
existing common law and replaced it with a civilian rule of this
kind. It simply has not occurred nor does there appear to be any
likelihood that it will occur in the future. Professor McInnes
appears to believe, however, that the Pettkus/Garland version of
the unjust enrichment principle has brought this Birksian
revolution to the shores of Canadian common law and has
replaced all existing doctrine with a civilian-inspired absence of
basis or absence of juristic reason approach. If the idea of
replacing all of the existing common law with a civilian rule that is
little understood within common law jurisdictions seems prepos-
terous to some, such sceptics may not be much reassured by the
notion that the Canadian law of restitution should now be re-
written by Birksite academics in a new version of the law inspired
by Birksian/civilian notions. Notwithstanding, my great admira-
tion for the academic branch of the profession, I hope that I am
not alone in thinking that this does not constitute a sensible plan
for the Canadian law of restitution.
As far as I know, the only scholar who has actually attempted to
work out in some detail how the new Birksian/civilian scheme
would apply to some standard fact situations covered by the
existing law is Professor Andrew Burrows, a leading English
restitution scholar and the author of an excellent text on the
subject.' Burrows demonstrates that, when applied to particular
fact situations, the Birksian model "is no easier to apply than the
common law approach."l 9 Although the initial statement of the
absence of basis rule appears more elegant than the common law,
"that elegance is superficial." 2 0 Once one begins to analyze each
situation with a view to determining the correct result, a number of
subtle analyses come into play (which, by the way, we shall
18. A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2011).
19. Ibid., at p. 100.
20. 1bid.
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essentially have to invent). Burrows observes that the Birksian
approach appears to be "elegant and straightforward only because
it pushes out of sight many of the difficult questions of law that are
dealt with 'up front' by the common law."21 Burrows concludes
this exercise with the observation that "there is no good reason to
abandon the common law approach." 22 I quite agree.
We may note in passing that if someone were to make a similar
suggestion to the effect that the existing common law be replaced
by its underlying principle with respect to a more well-understood
body of private law doctrine, such as the law of contracts, the idea
would not be taken seriously. For example, Professor Swan is of
the view that the underlying principle of the law of contracts is that
the law should give effect to the reasonable expectations of the
parties.23 No one, including Professor Swan, would suggest that
the existing law of contracts ought to simply be replaced by a new
rule that in every case the plaintiff should claim that the relief
sought is necessary to "give effect to the reasonable expectations of
the parties." Professor Swan would urge, surely, that in reforming
and adjusting the law of contracts, courts should attempt to align
the rules with this underlying principle. The idea that the existing
doctrines of the law of contracts could be simply replaced by the
underlying principle, however, would not be seriously entertained
by anyone. It would be easily seen that this would create
considerable instability and unpredictability in the law of
contracts. It would also be easily seen that to turn the underlying
principle into a new black letter rule that would replace all the
existing black letter rules involves what might be referred to as a
category mistake. It confuses the role of underlying principle with
the need for detailed rules that enable the profession to discern
rights and liabilities at the level of particularized factual
circumstances and disputes. In my view, there is no good reason
to make a similar category mistake in the context of the law of
restitution. Indeed, the need for some stability and predictability in
the law heavily weighs against doing so. Similarly, and at the risk
of stating the obvious, a proposal to replace the existing common
law of contracts with a new rule based on a civilian-inspired
general principle would be given short shrift.
21. Ibid.. at p. 11I.
22. Ibid., at p. 112.
23. A. Swan, Canadian Contract Lai, 2nd ed. (Toronto, LexisNexis, 2009). c. 1.3.
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III. "BEREFT OF SUPPORT"
McInnes claims that the Traditional Approach that the plaintiff
in a restitution claim must establish why he or she is entitled to
recover on the basis of the existing rules granting relief is "bereft of
judicial support." I do not agree.
We may put to one side the many thousands of cases, both in
Canada and in other common law jurisdictions, that apply the
Traditional Approach and that form the raw jurisprudential data
from which the modern law of restitution has been constructed.
The essential claim made by McInnes is that all of this traditional
law has been replaced by the Garlandized version of the Pettkus
statement of the unjust enrichment principle. In rebuttal, three
points should be made.
First, the view that the role of the unjust enrichment principle is
to provide a basis for reforming the existing doctrine or extending
relief beyond that available under existing law in novel situations
draws very strong support from recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada including, as we shall see, Kerr v. Baranow itself.
An illuminating discussion of the relationship between the existing
law which defines various categories of cases in which relief is
allowed and the general principle is to be found in the opinion of
McLachlin J., as she then was, in the 1992 decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario.24 In
Peel, McLachlin J. identified two alternative approaches to the
analysis of restitutionary cases - the Traditional Approach and
an approach based on the unjust enrichment principle - as
complementary modes of analysis. McLachlin J. described the two
approaches as follows:
The first is the traditional "category" approach. It involves looking to see if
the case fits into any of the categories of cases in which previous recovery
has been allowed, and then applying the criteria applicable to a given
category to see whether the claim is established. The second approach, which
might be called the "principled" approach, developed only in recent years. It
relies on criteria which are said to be present in all cases of unjust
enrichment: (1) benefit to the defendant; (2) corresponding detriment to the
plaintiff; and (3) the absence of any juridical reason for the defendant's
retention of the benefit.25
The existing "categories" of claims are obviously these recognized
by the existing law, i.e., the body of existing doctrine referred to by
24. (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, [19921 3 S.C.R. 762.
25. Ibid., p. 784 (S.C.R.).
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Birks as the "unjust factors." In her further discussion of the
relationship between the two approaches, McLachlin J. clearly
indicates that the role of the principled approach is that of
providing a basis for extending recovery beyond the traditional
categories of recovery. She explained, as follows:
The tri-partite principle of general application which this Court has
recognized as the basis of the cause of action for unjust enrichment is thus
seen to have grown out of the traditional categories of recovery. It is
informed by them. It is capable, however, of going beyond them, allowing
the law to develop in a flexible way as required to meet changing perceptions
of justice.
It follows from this that the traditional categories of recovery, while
instructive, are not the final determinants of whether a claim lies. In most
cases, the traditional categories of recovery can be reconciled with the
general principles enunciated in Peukus v. Becker ... But new silualions
can arise which do not fit into an established category of recovery but
nonetheless merit recognition on the basis of the general rule. 2 6
The unjust enrichment principle, it seems, provides a check on the
existing categories of recovery which remain instructive but are not
the final determinants of liability as "new situations can arise
which do not Fit into an established category of recovery but
nevertheless merit recognition on the basis of the general rule."
In Peel itself, McLachlin J. identified a number of traditional
categories of recovery (or "law") that might apply to the fact
situation at hand. In her view, however, the plaintiff failed to
establish that a genuine benefit had been conferred on the
defendant in this case and accordingly, the question of which, if
any of the existing categories of recovery was applicable to the Peel
facts was not necessary to resolve. In sum, the discussion in Peel
appears to be quite consistent with the view that the role of the
unjust enrichment or principled approach is to provide a basis for
extending the law beyond the existing categories of relief to "new
situations."
Second, it is worth emphasizing that McLachlin J.'s discussion
of the relationship between the existing categories of relief and the
role of the principled approach in extending relief in new situations
and "allowing the law to develop in a flexible way as required to
meet changing perceptions of justice" has been referred to on
subsequent occasions by the Supreme Court itself, notably in
Garland and, indeed, in Kerr v. Baranow. I will not repeat here the
26. bid., at pp. 788-789 (emphasis added).
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analysis I have offered elsewhere for the conclusion that the better
reading of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Garland
is that the court did not intend to replace all prior law with the
Garland two-step version of the unjust enrichment principle. 27 In
addition to the fact that the court did not plainly state that it was
replacing the existing common law with a rule drawn from civil
law, an important source of support for a less radical interpreta-
tion of Garland is that lacobucci J. in that case placed reliance on
the foregoing passages from Peel and indicated that his elabora-
tion of the unjust enrichment principle was simply an application
or explication of the Peel analysis. 2 8
Third, a real test for the McInnes thesis would be to find a
recent decision in which the restitutionary dispute before the
Supreme Court of Canada plainly was covered by an existing
category of relief and observe whether the court applied the
existing substantive law or, rather, simply abandoned the existing
doctrine and applied the Garland two-step version of the unjust
enrichment principle. 29 Such an opportunity arose in the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in B.M.P. Global Distribution Inc. i'.
Bank of Nova Scotia.30 B.M.P. Global involved a claim to recover a
mistaken payment. The recovery of mistaken payments is a central
illustration of the law of restitution or unjust enrichment at work.
Birks himself claimed that it was a "core case" and asserts as a
working definition of the law of unjust enrichment that it is "the
law of all events materially identical to the mistaken payment of a
non-existent debt."3 1 One simply could not have a better test case
as to whether Canadian law has abandoned the existing law and
moved to a civilian absence of basis rule. In its very interesting
judgment in B.M.P. Global, the Supreme Court of Canada applied
the existing law of mistaken payments. Indeed, it confirmed that
the existing Canadian common law pertaining to the mistaken
27. McCamus, supra, footnote 14, at pp. 489-494. See also, Maddaugh and
McCamus, supra, footnote 7, at pp. 3-35 to 3-38.2.
28. Garland, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 650 and 652 (S.C.R.).
29. McInnes draws support for his radical thesis from the occasional case such as
Jedfro Investments (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Jacyk Estate (2007), 289 D.L.R. (4th) 385,
[20071 3 S.C.R. 679, where the court denies relief on the basis that the benefit was
transferred on the basis of an existing and enforceable agreement. This existing
and well-recognized principle is as old as the law of restitution itself. The fact that
the court in applying the principle says that the contract provides a juristic reason
for the transfer is neither surprising nor, in my view, evidence that the court has
simply abandoned all prior common law in favour of the juristic reason/Garland
two-step analysis.
30. (2009), 304 D.L.R. (4th) 292, [2009] I S.C.R. 504.
31. Birks, supra, footnote 16, at p. 3.
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payments rule is consistent with the modern English reformulation
of the same rule.32 Interestingly, the court made no reference to the
Garland two-step analysis nor did it suggest that recovery was
based on a civilian absence of basis principle. It is therefore clearly
established Canadian law that in a mistaken payment case -
again, a core case of unjust enrichment - the plaintiff must come
forward and affirmatively prove that the payment was caused by a
mistake. In turn, the defendant may seek to defend the claim by
establishing a defence of change of position. The court did not
suggest that the defendant was restricted to defences based on
considerations of "reasonable expectations" or "public policy."
B.M.P. Global is thus an extremely inconvenient authority for
Professor McInnes. Simply stated, it is completely inconsistent
with his vision of the new Birksian Canadian restitutionary
doctrine. It is therefore of interest to note McInnes' reaction to
the case. McInnes describes the Supreme Court's failure to refer to
the Garland analysis as "anomalous"3 3 and appears to blame
counsel for the fact that the parties, "somewhat surprisingly," 34
failed to refer to either Garland or the two-step analysis. With
respect, this is not entirely convincing. First, though it is true that
the factums filed in the case do not refer to the Garland analysis,
there is some reference to "unjust enrichment" both in the decision
below of the British Columbia Court of Appeal and in one of the
respondents' factums. More importantly, Supreme Court of
Canada watchers well know that the court's current practice is
not to feel constrained by the arguments or lists of authorities
supplied by counsel when authoring a judgment in a particular
case.
Indeed, more surprisingly to me, neither the parties nor the
courts below made extensive reference to the body of law
pertaining to the recovery of moneys mistakenly paid on a forged
instrument, authorities which, for the most part, were mentioned
for the first time in this particular case in the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada. Surely, if the members of the Supreme
Court were of the view that the existing law of restitution has been
replaced by the Garland two-step analysis, the court would have
made reference to Garland, notwithstanding the failure of the
parties to do so. The more likely explanation for the fact that the
court simply applied the existing law relating to the recovery of
32. Barclais Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Sinuns Son & Cooke (Southern) Lid.. [1980] Q.B. 677.
33. McInnes, supra, footnote 3, at p. 119.
34. Ibid.
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moneys paid by mistake is that this is the body of existing doctrine
that applies to a fact situation of this kind.
In fairness to McInnes, it must be conceded that on at least one
occasion, the Supreme Court of Canada has analyzed an unjust
enrichment claim on the basis of the Garland two-step analysis
without reference to the existing law." As I have argued
elsewhere,36 however, the lesson that might be taken from that
exercise is that it is not particularly helpful for the court to simply
ignore existing doctrine in this fashion. Although the result of the
case is, in my view, perfectly satisfactory, the rule pronounced by
the court is based on an unprecedented notion of mutual mistake
that is likely to cause confusion in future cases. The more
important point for present purposes is that McInnes is surely
incorrect in observing that the Traditional Approach as to the
relationship between the traditional or existing law and the general
principle against unjust enrichment is "bereft of judicial support."
McInnes reassures the reader, however, that, essentially, no
harm has been done in B.M.P. Global. Thus, as he says, "while the
analysis certainly should have been brought up to date, the
outcome would have been the same in either event." 37 In proving
the "unjust factor" of mistaken payment, the claimant also
showed, in his view, that the defendants' enrichment lacked a
juristic reason. "The rogue's forgery both caused a mistake ... and
nullified the apparent basis of the transfer . . ."" Failure to refer to
the Garland two-step, it seems, was a matter of professional
sloppiness. It is unfortunate, he noted that "some members of the
profession have failed to keep abreast of recent developments." 39
If, as McInnes suggests, the proving of an unjust factor has the
serendipitous effect of also proving an absence of juristic reason
for the transfer, the debate as to whether the existing law has been
replaced by the absence of juristic reason analysis may seem a bit
sterile to the casual professional observer. We shall return to this
point.
35. Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City) (2005). 245 D.L.R. (4th) 211,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 575.
36. McCamus, sapra, footnote 14, at pp. 494-498.
37. McInnes, supra, footnote 3, at p. 119.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., at p. 120.
402 Canadian Business Law Journal
IV. "REJECTED IN KERR v. BARANOW"
More surprising to me, however, is McInnes' claim that the
Traditional Approach to the relationship between the existing law
of restitution and the Garland two-step has been "clearly rejected"
in Kerr v. Baranow. After making reference to the difference of
opinion he and I have with respect to the significance of the
Garland two-step and its relationship to the existing doctrine,
McInnes pronounces, that, in light of the Kerr decision, "[t]he
debate accordingly is over." 40 The "civilian-inspired model" 4 1
reigns. "The unjust factors no longer directly determine the
availability of restitution under any circumstances." 4 2 1 must say
that I find these claims rather puzzling. In Kerr, the court appears
to confirm that the existing law is to be retained but that the
principled Garland absence of juristic -reason analysis can be
employed by courts to extend relief in situations not covered by the
traditional categories of recovery.
The critical passage from the judgment of Cromwell J. from
which one may draw support for this view states as follows:
At the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment lies the notion of restoring a
benefit which justice does not permit one to retain: . . . For recovery,
something must have been given by the plaintiff and received and retained
by the defendant without juristic reason. A series of categories developed in
which retention of a conferred benefit was considered unjust. These
included, for example: benefits conferred under mistakes of fact or law;
under compulsion; out of necessity; as a result of ineffective transactions; or
at the defendant's request ...
Canadian law, however, does not limit unjust enrichment claims to these
categories. It permits recovery whenever the plaintiff can establish three
elements: an enrichment of or benefit to the defendant, a corresponding
deprivation of the plaintiff, and the absence of a juristic reason for the
enrichment: . . . By retaining the existing categories, while recognizing
other claims that fall within the principles underlying unjust enrichment, the
law is able "to develo in a flexible way as required to meet changing
perceptions of justice." 3
It seems to me that the meaning of this passage is rather clear.
Cromwell J. speaks of "retaining" the existing categories. The
40. McInnes, supra, footnote 1, at p. 281.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Kerr v. Baranoiw, supra, footnote 2, at paras. 31 and 32, (references deleted,
emphasis added). The last quoted phrase, of course, is from the opinion of
McLachlin J. in Peel, quoted above at footnote 25.
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existing categories, as the illustrations in the previous paragraph of
his judgment indicate, constitute the existing doctrines of the law
of restitution that are referred to by Birks as the "unjust factors."
The existing categories are "retained." Cromwell J. does not say
that they are replaced, supplanted, abolished or overruled by the
Garland two-step version of the tri-partite unjust enrichment
principle. Rather, he suggests that Canadian law recognizes, in
addition to the "existing categories" of claims, "other claims" that
fall within the "principles underlying unjust enrichment." New
claims, it should be emphasized, consistent with underlying
principles can, in his view, be recognized.
What kind of argument, then, would one expect counsel to make
in the case of the mistaken payment? Such a claim comes within an
existing category of relief. I assume the plaintiff would come
forward and attempt to demonstrate that the fact situation meets
all of the elements of the mistaken payment rule articulated so
recently and elegantly by the Supreme Court of Canada itself, as
noted above, in B.M.P. Global Distribution Inc. v. Bank of Nova
Scotia.44 Similarly, in a duress claim, I assume that the plaintiff
would come forward and try to demonstrate that the kinds of
threats made by the defendant are those that have been previously
held by Canadian courts to constitute duress in the existing
jurisprudence. In a necessitous intervention case, one would expect
plaintiffs counsel to rely on the existing jurisprudence dealing with
this question. And so on. In a case where plaintiffs counsel wanted
to extend the law and assert a claim other than those recognized by
the established categories of claims, presumably plaintiffs counsel
would try to persuade the court that the particular claim fell
"within the principles underlying unjust enrichment," as Cromwell
J. explained in Kerr.4 5 This is, of course, the Traditional Approach.
To give McInnes his due, however, it must be said that the Kerr
opinion does elaborate at some length on how the tri-partite
principle should apply to a claim for the division of wealth
accumulated during cohabitation once that relationship has come
to an end. This is, of course, a Pettkus v. Becker-type46 claim and it
is therefore perhaps not surprising that the court saw fit to apply
the tri-partite principle articulated for the first time by Dickson J.
in that case. It is, in my view, however, important to examine the
court's actual analysis of the claim and note where the law now
44. Supra, footnote 30.
45. In the passage quoted in the text above at footnote 43.
46. Supra, footnote 10.
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stands as a result of Kerr with respect to restitutionary claims of
this kind.
In the Kerr decision, the Supreme Court articulated at
considerable length the nature of the elements of this type of
claim and the types of evidence that should be led by a plaintiff
seeking to establish such a claim. In brief, the court explained that
such a claim lies for a portion of wealth jointly created by
cohabiting parties in circumstances where the relationship between
them constitutes a "joint family venture." 4 7 In such a relationship,
the parties' social and economic lives are intertwined to an extent
giving rise to an expectation on their part that the parties will share
the fruits of their joint labours on into the indefinite future. When,
contrary to their expectations, the relationship comes to an end, it
is unjust for one party to retain all of the wealth created by their
joint effort and team work. In a lengthy analysis which is both
illuminating of the nature of the claim and helpful to counsel
attempting to lead evidence to establish such a claim, Cromwell J.
elaborated at considerable length on the various factual elements
that might be considered to support a finding that the particular
circumstances of the relationship between the parties constitutes a
"joint family venture," thus giving rise to a claim for a share of
jointly created wealth upon dissolution of the relationship.
In a claim of this kind, then, we may ask what it is that the
plaintiff would seek to establish in persuading the court that such
an entitlement arises on the particular facts. Would the plaintiff's
counsel simply rely on the Garland two-step analysis and assert and
then prove that there exists an absence of all of the potential
"juristic reasons" for the "transfer" and thereby establish the prima
facie case with the burden then shifting, in the second step, to the
defendant to assert a defence based on reasonable expectations
and/or public policy? Or, rather, would the plaintiff assert the
existence of a joint family venture and then proceed to lead
evidence, of the kind described at length by Cromwell J. in Kerr, in
an attempt to establish a basis for a finding that the joint family
venture concept is applicable to relationship to the parties? In my
view, the answer to this question is obvious. Plaintiff's counsel
would be well advised to affirmatively claim and then establish the
factual basis for the existence of a joint family venture.
In sum, the effect of the Kerr decision is to recognize what Birks
would no doubt describe as a new "unjust factor" that a plaintiff
47. For an extensive account of this decision and its implications for this type of
claim. see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra. footnote 7. chapter 34.
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may affirmatively assert as a basis for restitutionary relief. It
appears to follow from the Kerr analysis, then, that the court's
view of the role of the unjust enrichment tri-partite analysis is to
facilitate the recognition of new unjust factors or, speaking more
plainly, new situations in which a restitutionary claim is appro-
priate rather than to simply obliterate and replace all of the
existing unjust factors jurisprudence. Perhaps, indeed, this is what
Cromwell J. is alluding to in the following passage in his Kerr
opinion:
Although the legal principles remain constant across subject areas, they must
be applied in the particular factual and social context out of which the claim
arises. . . . Thus, while the underlying legal principles of the law of unjust
enrichment are the same for all cases, the courts must apply those common
principles in ways that respond to the particular context in which they are to
operate.4 8
Once the court has done so and indicated the particular factual
context giving rise to a successful restitution claim in a new
"subject area," it seems rather likely that the court intends that
plaintiff's counsel would plead such facts and attempt to assert
them rather than to simply engage in the Garland two-step, absence
of juristic reason, analysis. Certainly in a Pettkus-type claim,
plaintiffs counsel would be well advised, after Kerr, to assert the
existence of a joint family venture and affirmatively attempt to
persuade the court that such a relationship exists on the facts of the
parties' relationship.
Perhaps an even more striking feature of the Kerr decision is
that at no point in the judgment does the court actually apply the
Garland two-step analysis. That is to say, the first step in the
Garland two-step requires the plaintiff to establish the negative
proposition that there exists no contract, gift, or other statutory,
common law or equitable basis to explain the transfer. Under the
Garland two-step, once the plaintiff establishes this negative
proposition, a prima facie case to recover is established and the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish defences based on
"reasonable expectations" and "public policy." Again, at no point
in the opinion does the court actually indicate that the plaintiff has
attempted to discharge the burden of proving this negative
proposition and conclude that the burden has been successfully
discharged. It is not mentioned that the plaintiff has disproved the
existence of contract and gift. 49 No indication is given of the nature
48. Kerr v. Baranowv, supra, footnote 2, para. 34 (emphasis added).
49. Indeed, an attempt by the plaintiff to prove the absence of a gift intention might
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of the statutory, common law or equitable reasons for a transfer of
which the plaintiff has disproven the existence. In short, as a
practical matter the first step of the Garland two-step is simply
ignored by the court.
Perhaps, however, I have misunderstood the nature of the first
step of the Garland two-step. Perhaps it is sufficient for the plaintiff
to simply assert that he or she is not aware of any contract, gift,
statutory, common law or equitable basis for the transfer thereby
shifting the burden to the defendant to engage in a step-two
defence. Even if one assumes, however, that the first step of
Gar/and two-step is essentially a meaningless ritual of this kind, it
is similarly noteworthy that it is never mentioned by the court in
Kerr that the plaintiff successfully engaged in such a ritualistic
endeavour. But surely McInnes would argue that it could not have
been the intention of the court in Garland to impose a meaningless
ritual on the plaintiff when relying on the two-step analysis. Surely
the test was meant to impose an evidentiary burden of some kind
on the plaintiff. There is no evidence in the Kerr judgment that, in
the court's view, the plaintiff successfully discharged whatever that
burden might be. Consistently with the view that what the court
actually did in Kerr was to recognize the existence of a new "unjust
factor," it is not surprising, from my perspective at least, that the
court did not engage in an extensive articulation of the first step of
the Garland analysis and hold the plaintiff to a proof of the
absence of all of the enumerated factors.o
In sum, then, it is my view that both in its explicit reasoning with
respect to the Garland principle and in the actual analytical model
developed by the court for granting relief in the particular fact
situation, the Kerr decision does not abolish, reject or supplant the
existing Canadian common law of restitution with a simple
application of the Garland two-step test. With respect to its
explicit reasoning concerning the general test, Cromwell J. plainly
indicates that the "existing categories" of recovery are "retained"
rather than abolished, overruled, supplanted or replaced. As far as
the actual analysis of the plaintiffs claim in Kerr is concerned, the
court plainly develops what will function in the future as a new
have produced an interesting analysis. For discussion of this point, consistent
with the Kerr result, see Maddaugh and McCarnus, supra, footnote 7, p. 34-22.
50. Indeed, I think it is true that in none of the post-Garland cases is the First step
actually applied in this sense. It would be a substantial achievement for a plaintiff
to enumerate, not to say disprove, the existence of all the potential juristic
reasons for a transfer. One of the many problems with the Garland test, surely, is
the impracticality of actually imposing such a burden on the plaintiff.
[Vol. 52
2012] Unjust Enrichment, Existing Categories and Kerr v. Baranow 407
unjust factor in cases of this kind - the establishment of a joint
family venture followed by dissolution of the relationship. Further,
the court never actually applies the specifics of the Garland two-
step analysis to the plaintiffs claim. The court does not identify the
factors that either were or should have been enumerated by the
plaintiff as part of that first step nor does it make a finding that the
burden of disproving their existence was successfully discharged by
the plaintiff.
V. "WRONG IN PRINCIPLE" AND "BAD FOR PRACTICE"
For the sake of brevity, I will comment only briefly on Professor
McInnes' allegations that my views are both "wrong in principle"
and "bad for practice." With respect to the former point, as
intimated above, I am simply not aware of any principle, nor does
he mention one, which indicate that the Traditional Approach is
"wrong in principle." On the contrary, it seems to me that the view
that a plaintiff should try to base a successful claim on existing
precedents and resort to the unjust enrichment principle when
seeking a modification or extension of prior law is an approach
that is both sound in principle and consistent with the approach
taken in our private law generally. It is implicitly and sometimes,
as in Pettikus v. Becker,5 1 explicitly adopted in restitution cases that
effect modifications of the existing law. 52
It is unclear to me what it is that Professor McInnes is getting at
in suggesting that the Traditional Approach is "bad for practice."
If Professor McInnes is suggesting that the Traditional Approach
renders the law uncertain and unstable, I would suggest the
contrary. Continuing to apply the existing authorities where
applicable could only have the effect of rendering the law more
stable and predictable. Thus, for example, applying the existing
law of mistaken payments to the claim in B.M.P. Global, rather
than simply applying the Garland two-step and making the law up
51. Supra, footnote 10.
52. The traditional relationship between existing precedents and the underlying
unjust enrichment principle is explicitly acknowledged in the recently published
Restatement Third. The detailed existing rules imposing restitutionary liability (or
"unjust factors") occupy most of the Restatement's two volumes. Section I sets
out the general principle against unjust enrichment and then cautions that the list
of detailed liability rules cannot be considered to be exclusive, for "cases may
arise that fall outside every pattern of unjust enrichment [i.e., the 'unjust factors']
except the rule of the present section." See American Law Institute, Restatement
of the Law Third: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (St. Paul. American Law
Institute Publishers, 2011), p. 4.
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from scratch renders the analysis of the problem, in my view, much
easier to predict. The attraction of the Garland two-step analysis
for the busy practitioner, no doubt, is that is appears to reduce the
entire law of restitution to a simple formulaic rule that can be
easily memorized and trotted out in professional conversation. The
problem with it, however, is that, at the end of the day, it does not
tell one every much about how cases of the kind at hand have been
decided in the past and how they are likely to be decided in the
future.
Be that as it may, it is, surely, rather diflicult to decide which
approach -the Traditional Approach or the Garland two-step -
is bad for practice. Practitioners are very able to deal with
uncertainty in the law. Perhaps the real loss suffered from
instability and uncertainty in the law is borne by its consumers,
those who seek advice with respect to their legal rights and
obligations. At the present time, one who writes an opinion on a
difficult point of restitution law must write an opinion - I have
had the opportunity to do so myself on a number of occasions -
in two parts. The first part will typically analyse the problem in
light of the existing authorities and offer a view as to the likely
analysis of the client's position on the basis of existing doctrine. As
in other areas of the law, where the existing law appears
anomalous or ripe for modification, a properly crafted opinion
would indicate the possibilities for such modification of the
doctrine as might well occur. In light of the instability in the
contemporary law of restitution introduced by the Garland two-
step analysis, one must go on, however, to opine that a court could
simply apply the Garland two-step analysis to the situation at hand
and that, in that case, the outcome of the analysis is even more
difficult, perhaps impossible, to predict. I doubt that anything is to
be gained, from a practical point of view, by rejecting the
Traditional Approach and omitting the first part of such opinions.
VI. THE BIRKSIAN PYRAMID SCHEME
One suspects that Birks himself appreciated that a simple
abandonment of the existing law or "unjust factors" and its
replacement by an "absence of basis" principle drawn from the
civil law would not gain wide or easy acceptance. Perhaps for this
reason, Birks proposed in Unjust Enrichment 5 3 a "limited
reconciliation" of the two approaches. The reconciliation, in his
53. Supra, footnote 16.
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view, would be constituted by a layered pyramid with abstract
notions of unjust enrichment at the top, absence of basis in the
middle and a base constituted by the unjust factors themselves.
Some sense of the subtlety of this concept is conveyed in the
following passages from his work:
The previous pages show that a limited reconciliation between the two
approaches lies in making the intent-based unjust factors subservient to
absence of basis, which itself then becomes an intermediate generalization
between the unjust factors and unjust. The pyramid can be constructed in
which, at the base, the particular unjust factors such as mistake, pressure, and
undue influence become reasons why, higher up, there is no basis for
defendant's acquisition, which is then the master reason why, higher up still
the enrichment is unjust and must be surrendered. There is no room at the
base of this pyramid for policies dictating restitution. The logic of the
pyramid is that a policy which does not invalidate the basis of an enrichment
has no relevance at all, and a policy which does destroy that basis is
irrelevant, since the invalidity is sufficient in itself, without regard to the
reason for it. Hence, "policies dictating restitution" becomes "any other
reason for invalidity", where "other" means "other than non-voluntariness".
The base of the pyramid thus consists of all the categories of deficient intent
(no intent, impaired intent, and qualified intent) together with all other
causes of invalidity. All these work through "absence of basis". A single
proposition covers every case: an enrichment at the expense of another is
unjust when it is received without explanatory basis.54
Lifted out of context and without further explanation, it is not
possible to portray the full complexity of the Birksian Pyramid
Scheme. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the basic
idea is that the unjust factors (or some of them) are buried at the
bottom of the pyramid under propositions of increasing levels of
abstraction.
In his note and in another recent article, 5 McInnes, second to
none in his enthusiasm for the later writing of Professor Birks,
embraces the Birksian Pyramid Scheme and, indeed, somewhat
improbably, appears to claim that it is now an established feature
of the Canadian law of restitution. For those of us who feel that
it would be simply foolish to abolish the existing common law and
replace with a civilian rule little understood in common law
jurisdictions, there should be good news in this. The existing law
has not disappeared. It has just moved into the basement of the
54. Ibid., at p. 116.
55. M. McInnes, "Garland's Unitary Test of Unjust Enrichment: A Response to
Professor McCamus" (2011). 38 Adv. Q. 165.
56. IMid., at pp. 194-196.
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Birksian pyramid. As Mcinnes explains, "the historical cases
concerning doctrines like mistake and necessity remain not only
relevant, but indispensable." 5 7
There are a number of problems with this approach, however,
not the least of them being it is not at all clear what it means at a
practical level. Birks and McLnnes appear to believe that the
existing law - the "unjust factors" - no longer serve as rules of
law. McInnes offers us as illustrations of the operation of the
pyramid scheme a case in which an aunt transfers money First, by
mistake and secondly, as a result of undue influence exercised upon
her. In each case, as best I can understand, the money is
recoverable because of the absence of a juristic reason for the
transfer. But, apart from incanting that "rule," one must delve
deeper into the situation and discover that the money was paid, in
the first instance, by mistake. This is not to say, however, that the
court is simply applying the existing rule relating to the recovery of
mistaken payments. That would be inconsistent with the Birksian
pyramid and its replacement of the existing common law with the
absence of basis rule. McInnes explains:
The unjust factor of mistake traditionally drew upon the common law's
accumulated wisdom - countless cases heard by countless judges over
hundreds of years - regarding the reversibility of benefits conferred in error.
In the same way, the juristic reason analysis now draws upon the policies and
principles historically collected under the rubric of "mistake".5
Similarly, in the second instance - payment by an aunt under
undue influence a court would apply the rule granting recovery
in the absence of a juristic reason for the transfer but "it would
invoke the concept of 'undue influence' not as an unjust factor per
se, but rather as a means of drawing upon the underlying analysis.
That label, like 'mistake', imports a sensitive balance, struck
between competing interests, over the course of centuries." 59
And so, if I understand McInnes correctly, the existing law of
mistake and undue influence is no longer to be considered to
constitute law in the sense of "rules" but, rather, a source of
guidance to a court applying the absence of juristic reason "rule"
drawing from the historical wisdom of the common law.
57. Ibid., at p. 194.
58. Ibid., at p. 195. It is not clear that Birks would agree. In his elaboration of the
new civilian absence of basis scheme, he maintained that in a mistake case, "[tihe
mistake of the claimant has nothing to do with it." It's the absence of basis that is
determinative. See Birks, supra, footnote 16, at p. 132.
59. McInnes. supra, footnote 55. at pp. 195-196.
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Accordingly, if at long last the Supreme Court of Canada were to
clarify some of the difficulties in the existing doctrine (or whatever
we are now to call it) of undue influence, this would not be a
change in the law or rules of undue influence. This would be a
change in the historic advice to be derived from the common law in
applying the rule allowing recovery in the absence of a juristic
reason for the transfer. Similarly, the clarification made of the
mistaken payment rule (I beg forgiveness for using the term "rule"
but I am not sure what other term to use) in the B.M.P. Global case
is not a change in a legal rule or test but, rather, a revision in the
wisdom emerging from the mistake corner of the basement of the
Birksian Pyramid Scheme.
I hope that I am not alone in thinking that this is altogether too
clever by half. Three brief points may be made. First, in response
to the suggestion that the Birksian Pyramid Scheme is now part of
the Canadian law of restitution, I see no evidence for this. I am not
aware of any suggestion of this kind being made in the cases. I
doubt very much that many judges have heard of the Birksian
Pyramid Scheme or, indeed, have applied their minds to the
delicate shift of such doctrines as mistake or undue influence from
their status as "rules of law" to sources of guidance or advice in
applying higher level and more abstract rules of law. I suspect that
Canadian judges, as B.M.P. Global indicates, will continue to
apply the doctrines of mistake and undue influence, for example,
as if they form part of the fabric of Canadian "law" in the
traditional sense. Moreover, in those cases in which courts apply
the absence of juristic reason test as if it were a new comprehensive
rule of law, they typically simply ignore the existing law and make
up the rules from scratch.60 In so doing, they run the risk of
creating a bewildering body of doctrine.
Second, it is not at all obvious that this transformation of
"rules" of law into sources of "guidance" is at all helpful to the
profession. In an undue influence case, for example, I expect that
Canadian common law lawyers and judges will continue to feel
comfortable applying the familiar doctrines of undue influence and
60. See, e.g., Kosaka v. Chan (2010), 312 D.L.R. (4th) 32 (B.C.C.A.), in which the
court applies the juristic reason test, ignores the substantial body of existing law
on point and articulates a new rule that rests on a misunderstanding of the nature
of this type of liability. For discussion, see Maddaugh and McCamus. supra,
footnote 7, section 21:200.25, "Must the Anticipated Agreement be Fully
Formed?" See also, Harraway v. Harraway (2009), 315 D.L.R. (4th) 182
(B.C.C.A.), in which the existing and applicable law of resulting trusts is simply
ignored.
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mistake as if they constitute rules of law rather than embracing the
Birksian Pyramid Scheme. In no other area of private law have we
taken the existing rules and doctrines and converted them into
some sort of nether world of advice or guidance that is neither law
nor non-law. I must say that I cannot conceive of a good reason
for doing so and cannot imagine making a persuasive case for this
kind of exotic doctrinal transformation to the profession at large.
As noted above, I quite agree with Professor Burrows that there is
simply "no good reason to abandon the common law approach"6 '
and replace it with the Birksian Pyramid Scheme.
Third, however well McInnes may consider that the Birksian
Pyramid Scheme works with respect to bodies of doctrine (or
whatever) concerning mistake and undue influence, the analytical
model does not work nearly as well with other aspects of
restitutionary law. It is difficult to jam into the Birksian Pyramid
Scheme cases permitting recovery of benefits conferred, for
example, in response to an emergency. In the context of other
types of claims such as benefits conferred in anticipation of
agreement or compulsory discharge of another's liability, the
problem is not so much that they could not be made to fit within
the Procrustean Bed, but, rather, that the "no juristic reason
analysis" is likely to mislead.
Moreover, both Birks and McInnes would agree, presumably,
that the Birksian Pyramid Scheme simply could not apply to that
vast body of restitutionary law that facilitates the recovery of
benefits acquired through wrongful conduct of various kinds. In
his later phase, Birks would justify this on the basis that "unjust
enrichment" must be narrowly confined to cases that fit the
pyramid model, thereby expelling from the subject of "unjust
enrichment" much of the content of modern treatises on the law of
61. Supra, footnote 18, at p. 112.
62. See, e.g., Kosaka v. Chan. supra, footnote 60. In my view, McInnes himself falls
prey to this difficulty with one of his illustrations of the different results that
might obtain under the new Birksian/civilian order he favours. McInnes believes
that the English decision in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc 1'. I.R.C., [20071
I A.C. 558 (H.L.). would be decided differently in post-Garland Canada. The
plaintiff mistakenly paid a tax earlier than required on the basis of an invalid
provision requiring early payment of an otherwise legitimate tax. The plaintiff
successfully recovered the value conferred by paying the amount due earlier than
required on the basis that this was a mistakenly conferred benefit. McInnes
disagrees on the basis that since the tax itself was legitimate there existed a
statutory juristic reason for the transfer and the claim should be denied. But
surely, as the decision holds, the legitimacy of the tax shouldn't preclude recover
of the value mistakenly conferred by early payment. See McInnes. supra, footnote
55, at p. 192.
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restitution. Thus, for example, undue influence is part of the law of
unjust enrichment in this narrow sense but fiduciary obligation is
not. This is, in my view, an approach which is also unsatisfactory
for various reasons but that is another and longer story. The fact
that fiduciary duty and undue influence are related concepts -
both arising in the context of relationships of "trust and
confidence" - offers a clue as to the unsatisfactory nature of
the Birksian narrow view of "unjust enrichment."
VII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the triumphant tone of the note by Professor
McInnes, I am not yet persuaded that the Canadian law of
restitution has reached a stage where it has, alone in the common
law world, either abolished all existing common law and replaced it
with a civilian doctrine of the kind recommended by Professor
Birks or that it has followed Professor Birks in adopting the
Birksian Pyramid Scheme. More particularly, I think it is a
misreading of the Garland6 3 decision to take the view that it either
intended or has achieved such a radical transformation of
Canadian law. Further, and this is really the point of this note, I
think that Professor McInnes misleads readers when he claims that
the recent decision in Kerr v. Baranow64 has rejected the existing
common law in favour of a simple civilian rule of general
application.
In my view, the Kerr opinion is quite consistent with what I have
described above as the Traditional Approach of applying the
existing and detailed rules of law and resorting to the tri-partite
unjust enrichment principle when seeking to modify those rules or
to extend liability in new types of claims. As noted, Cromwell J.
specifically states that the "existing categories" of liability, i.e., the
existing law, are "retain[ed]." 65 They have not been abolished,
supplanted, overruled or replaced by a new civilian rule. Resort to
the general principle against unjust enrichment as formulated in
Pettkus and Garland appears to be intended by the court to be
utilized when "new situations . . . arise which do not fit into an
established category of recovery but nevertheless merit recognition
on the basis of the general rule."6 6 As Cromwell J. stated in Kerr,6 7
63. Supra, footnote 4.
64. Supra, footnote 2.
65. Ibid., at para. 32.
66. Peel, supra, footnote 24, at p. 789.
67. Supra, footnote 2, para. 32.
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quoting in part McLachlin J. in Peel,68 "[b]y retaining the existing
categories, while recognizing other claims that fall within the
principles underlying unjust enrichment, the law is able 'to develop
in a flexible way as required to meet changing perceptions of
justice."' 69
As noted above, I believe that it is also important to carefully
observe the actual reasoning of the court in Kerr. In effect, the Kerr
court, relying to be sure to some extent on the unjust enrichment
principle, developed a detailed analysis of what might now be
referred to as the "unjust factor" in a dispute concerning property
division on dissolution of cohabitation, i.e., the Pettkus-type claim.
In proving such a claim in the future, it is clearly the case that the
plaintiff will be well advised to affirmatively allege and attempt to
prove, leading evidence of the kind identified by Cromwell J., that
the relationship between the parties constituted a "joint family
venture" in which the parties had expectations of sharing jointly-
produced wealth on into the indefinite future. The Kerr court did
not suggest that in such a case in the future the plaintiff should
simply rely on the absence of juristic reason test. Moreover, as a
practical matter, at no point in the Kerr opinion was the Garland
two-step analysis actually applied to the plaintiffs claim. There
was no suggestion that the plaintiff had at any point either
articulated or, having done so, proved the absence of the existence
of all possible juristic reasons for the transfer of value as a method
of establishing a prima facie case for restitutionary recovery. It
seems clearly to be the view of the Kerr court that the Garland two-
step analysis is useful when attempting to recognize new types of
claims but does not replace the existing law relating to established
heads of restitutionary liability.
Finally, in my view, the McInnes plan of burying the existing
common law in the basement of the Birksian Pyramid beneath
layers of Birksian abstraction simply adds unnecessary complexity
and confusion to a body of law that suffers, to a greater degree
than contract and tort, from a lack of familiarity and under-
standing by the profession at large. The great achievement of the
original Restatement of Reslitution70 and the main stream treatises
that flowed in its wake was to make a vast body of private law that
had been much ignored by 19th-century treatise writers available in
68. Supra, footnote 24.
69. Kerr, supra, footnote 2, at para. 32, quoting Peel, supra, footnote 24, at p. 788.
70. American Law Institute, Restatemeni of Restitution (Philadelphia, American Law
Institute Publishers, 1937).
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an accessible form to the profession. I do not doubt that there has
been a very substantial increase in the familiarity of the profession
generally with restitutionary law and concepts over the last several
decades in common law jurisdictions. Burying the existing law and
its easily understood and easily explained 7 1 categories of claims
under layers of Birksian obscurantism runs the risk, in my view, of
undoing this substantial advance in professional knowledge and
understanding of our private law.
71. If we were to start, as I think we should, with the proposition that it ought to be
possible to explain with relative ease the basic liability rules to the ordinary
mortals who are subject to them - as we can in contract and tort - we would
not end up by replacing the existing law of mistake, duress, undue influence, etc.,
with a difficult to describe civilian absence of juristic reason test and/or the
Birksian Pyramid Scheme.
